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I. INTRODUCTION
When I was approached about writing a review of my chosen
torts book for this issue of the Law Review, I was a bit hesitant. After
all, torts was not really my specialty. I was primarily an environ-
mental law professor who came to torts because I wanted to help my
law school with the always heavy first-year teaching load. Among
first-year courses, I chose torts because I liked the subject matter area,
and it was related to some of the research that I did in environmental
law; however, I am no expert. Could I then have anything of value to
say to those, including new law professors, who come to this issue
seeking guidance on which casebook to use in their own first experi-
ence teaching torts? After some consideration, I decided that the an-
swer was yes. After all, most law professors who tackle torts for the
first time, whether new to the academy or simply changing their
course load, will also not be self-described experts in torts. Like me,
they may come to their first class with a bit of institutional history in
their law schools as to which torts book is best or perhaps, also like
me, they will be splitting the course with another faculty member who
already has a preferred book.
That was my history and that is how I initially came to my torts
book. Though I was certainly not limited in which torts casebook I
could use, the fact that other professors in my school were already us-
ing a casebook was a powerful motivator for sticking with that case-
book. After all, many new professors, or professors taking on a new
classroom preparation, are already swamped with work. Reviewing
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multiple casebooks will only add to that load, and if mentors on the
faculty are already using another book, why rock the boat without a
powerful reason?
I could end here, and this would be enough for many new law
professors. Having examined several different torts casebooks after
my first year, I have run across few duds. The lesson for the new
teacher is that, because few of the books are truly bad, it may be suffi-
cient to simply begin with the casebook that is the easiest to prepare
with (the one already used by faculty at your school), at least for the
first time. You are probably not going to be stuck with a total bomb if
someone in your school is already using the book and you may get ex-
cellent help from those who are already teaching with a given text.
For while the casebooks themselves may be of sound vintage, the same
cannot be said for all of the accompanying teacher's manuals. Thus, if
you do have important questions about your book and how to teach
certain topics (and you will), it may be advantageous to have your very
own casebook decoder, in the form of a colleague, who is prepared to
help you.
Nevertheless, if you are still curious, are particularly unsatisfied
with the "fallback" casebook, or are simply looking for an approach to
using a casebook or teaching a torts class in a way to get the most out
of it, some things I have learned in teaching torts and in using the
casebook that I do, which is the casebook with which I started, may be
of help. I think the best way of doing this is to make the selection of
the casebook a part of the bigger question of teaching the class as a
whole. Consequently, in order to demonstrate the value of Epstein on
Torts, it will be necessary to describe how I came to teach the torts
class I teach. This may be broader than simply looking at the pluses
and minuses of a particular casebook, but I do not really believe that
the two can be separated. Moreover, a description of the process of
teaching the whole class may be as or more helpful than simply de-
scribing a book in a vacuum.
II. WHAT Do YOU WANT TO ACCOMPLISH?
I believe that the most important question in determining which
casebook one should use for any course, and the most important ques-
tion in approaching the teaching of a class, is what you as a teacher
want to accomplish. This is an individual determination for which
there are no correct answers. It depends on your strengths as a
teacher, what your institution wishes to impart to students of your
class, whether you are focused more on substantive law or the reason-
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ing process, and what kind of students you have-what they want and
for what they will likely use the material.
For instance, if you are generally a shy person or uncomfortable
being "on stage," you may need to choose a casebook that depends
more on student exercises than on lecture or Socratic method. If your
school has determined that torts will be a basic three-hour class, with
attention only to negligence, then you will want to focus on a book
that treats negligence in the way you think your students should be
taught. By contrast, a text's treatment of the dignitary harms of strict
liability may be immaterial.
For my class, I was guided by what I (and the college) wanted the
students to get from the class, as well as where our students were in
terms of their own learning needs and prospective employment op-
tions. I teach at Georgia State University College of Law in Atlanta,
Georgia. We have been very successful in a relatively short time, do-
ing well in national rankings, attracting talented students, and becom-
ing a vibrant part of the intellectual and legal life of the city of Atlanta.
After graduation, our students work in government positions, large
firms, non-profits, and small to mid-size firms, as well as solo prac-
tices. Our students are good, with a high level of competency, a
wealth of past experience, and a healthy demand for results. Our stu-
dents want practical knowledge but want to be challenged academi-
cally; to pass the bar, but also to be the intellectual stars in their future
careers.
Thus, one of the important goals of our torts classes is to help
our students with the nuts and bolts-to make sure that they learn the
basic substantive law. To that end, students should not be able to
leave a torts class without firmly understanding the elements of an in-
tentional tort, the elements of negligence, and the situations that call
for the application of a strict liability regime. This is not enough,
however. Because our students want to be challenged and to learn
about the theories underpinning law, we must go further. While we
are not Yale or Harvard and are thus not in the business of primarily
teaching our students academic theory,1 we do have a cadre of students
who would be at home in that environment and who could learn a
great deal with some instruction in theory. Such theoretical underpin-
nings are also valued in the creative environment where many of our
students will work within the government and private sectors. So in
addition to the basics, I want our students to learn of the theoretical
underpinnings of torts, to understand why the reasonable person stan-
1. That comment is not meant as an insult to the faculties or students of either Yale or
Harvard.
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dard can be approximated by the economic efficiency model,2 and to
be able to identify when theories of strict liability can be utilized to ar-
gue for a higher standard of care in certain circumstances.3
Additionally, we want our students to learn how to "think like a
lawyer"-a somewhat amorphous standard in common parlance, but
one that I define as being able to organize thoughts and legal analysis
clearly and to present it in a way that may affect the legal outcome
governing a factual situation. "Thinking like a lawyer" may be viewed
primarily as a practical skill, but theoretical training can certainly bol-
ster a student's acquisition of such skills.
Last, but certainly not least, we are a school that prides itself on
teaching, and believes that interested and engaged students are more
likely to learn and think creatively. I enjoy theatrics in teaching and
thus need a book that helps support the "fun" in the classroom.
Overall then, I want a casebook that clearly outlines the black let-
ter law, but does so with challenging theory, helps the students think
in an organized manner, and is fun. Too much to ask? Perhaps, but
these goals are a good starting point for what I wanted in a torts case-
book and explain my reasons for continuing to use Epstein on Torts.
III. How EPSTEIN GETS THE JOB DONE
The first virtue of the Epstein casebook is that it is interesting to
read. Though torts law is not merely a collection of well-known or in-
fluential cases, torts cases do have the virtue of being interesting, and
probably because they are so memorable, the canon of cases may be
similar from book to book. Most law students do not get out of law
school without remembering the poor sickly Vosburg child, who suf-
fers an abscessed knee because of the "tap" of Mr. Putney,4 or the brat
"Dailey" kid who pulls the chair out from under Ms. Garrett.' Add to
this Rylands v. Fletcher,6 Carroll Towing,7 Palsgraf,s the train cases,9
2. See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), reprinted in RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 190 (7th ed. 2000) (determining barge owner's
liability for injuries as a "function of three variables: (1) [tlhe probability that [the barge] will
break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury[] if [it] does; [and] (3) the burden of adequate
precautions."); see also Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972)
(presenting a principled overview of the Hand formula as a barometer of reasonability under neg-
ligence law).
3. See Powell v. Fall, 5 Q.B. 597 (1880), reprinted in EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 127.
4. See Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891), reprinted in EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at
4.
5. See Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955), referenced in EPSTEIN,
supra note 2, at 7-8.
6. L.R. 3 E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868), reprinted in EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 116.
7. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169.
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and the spring gun cases,' ° and you go a long way to filling up your
book. Though these cases primarily are standards used to explore as-
pects of the black letter law, they are also interesting, providing a lad-
der of accessibility to the more complicated and nuanced structure of
tort law itself.
Epstein exploits this natural drama well. He not only presents
the chestnuts, but also he presents much of the factual background
and the follow-up that make the cases even more interesting and com-
pelling to students." Of course, his is not the only casebook to do so.
In something of a trend, many casebooks have taken to providing
background on cases, but not all do so with a mind to currying inter-
est. Happily, Epstein's clear and thoughtful explanatory notes provide
a powerful boost in interest level as well as explication.
Further boosting the "fun" level, Epstein chooses an array of
lesser-known, but factually interesting, cases that keep the students
hanging on when they might otherwise tire. A personal favorite is the
"flopper" case, a case about assumption of risk whose facts revolve
around a carnival ride that was a sort of stepless escalator on which
people tried to keep their balance.' Keeping their balance was not
easy, but for young couples that was apparently the point, as they fell
upon each other giggling and trying to regain their balance-a sort of
sanctioned form of necking, something that amusement parks have
long provided for the young. This case allows me to draw a diagram
on the board, bringing in some visual stimulation, felt to be important
in adult learning. 3 What can I say? Drawing the "flopper" always
amuses the class, and I am not too proud to go for the cheap laugh.
But Epstein is the one that gives me these opportunities. Drawing
pictures or acting out voices may not be your strength in the class-
room, but starting with something that can be made visually interest-
8. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), reprinted in EPSTEIN, supra note
2, at 501.
9. In addition to Palsgraf, some classics include Rylands, L.R. 3 E. & I. App. 330; Eckert v.
Long Island Railroad, 43 N.Y. 502 (1871), reprinted in EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 181; and Balti-
more & Ohio Railroad v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), reprinted in EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at
270. Cases involving trains and railroads figure prominently in the torts lexicon.
10. See, e.g., Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971), referenced in EPSTEIN, supra
note 2, at 44.
11. See id. at 44-45 (recounting the very interesting story of Katko v. Briney, in which the
outrage of liability for someone shooting a criminal defendant is well illustrated).
12. See Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929), reprinted in
EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 346.
13. Paula Lustbader, Teach in Context: Responding to Diverse Student Voices Helps All Stu-
dents Learn, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 402, 404 (1998).
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ing or theatrical allows the teacher to bring these cases to life himself
or herself or figure out ways for students to do so.
Epstein also selects cases that are well written by respected and
legendary judges. Again, while they may not be the only cases to il-
lustrate a point, they do so with flair. The day we discussed the case
of Andrews v. United Airlines,14 many students were quoting the won-
derful, wry warning from Judge Kozinski that "what goes up must
come down. For, while the skies are friendly enough, the ground can
be a mighty dangerous place when heavy objects tumble from over-
head compartments.""5
By focusing on interesting facts and then providing explanatory
text, Epstein also illuminates the importance of perspective. Fleshing
out the facts of a case often shows the influence of the perspective of
the tribunal-a factor that I believe the law student should always be
aware of, particularly in torts where it may explain an otherwise inex-
plicable outcome. It may not be true that negligence emerged simply
as a subsidy to nascent industries and their industrialist owners (a po-
sition explored in some length in Epstein),16 but law students should
be aware that a great current of legal thought believes that case results
may be related to the wants and prejudices of the powerful." This can
be no more chillingly conveyed than the Buch"8 case where, in finding
that a company was not liable for an eight year old child's hand being
crushed in a factory machine even though the overseer did not make
the boy leave when he saw him being trained on the machine by his
thirteen year old brother, the judge says:
An infant, no matter of how tender years, is liable in law for his
trespasses.... If, then, the defendants' machinery was injured
by the plaintiffs act in putting his hand in the gearing, he is li-
able to them for the damages in an action of trespass and to
nominal damages for the wrongful entry. 9
In making the presentation enjoyable and interesting, Epstein
does not sacrifice the basic lessons that are to be learned from torts.
His black letter law is clearly presented and accurate. When a concept
is introduced, more often than not Epstein will follow the discussion
with a summary of the law, usually from the Restatement. The case-
book starts with the overview of intentional torts and then moves into
14. 24 F.3d 39 (9th Cir. 1994).
15. Id. at 40, reprinted in EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 197.
16. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 105-11.
17. Id.
18. Buch v. Amory Mfg .Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1897).
19. Id., reprinted in EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 550.
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negligence. For those wishing to cover more advanced topics, there is
a discussion of modern strict liability and emotional and dignitary
harms. Though many torts books follow this example, there is still a
hangover of the "old" style that presents cases and asks questions
without actually setting out the elements of a particular tort. While
this has been defended as forcing the student to think, thus gaining
one of the goals of the first year curriculum, I find the "hide the ball"
theory unbelievably frustrating for most law students. There is so
much to learn in the first year curriculum that many students floun-
dering for the basics may never even find the time to "think like a
lawyer." At best, many learn to "think like a law professor" for pur-
poses of an exam. In addition, when the students are at least given the
black letter law, it decreases the discomfort they may feel with the So-
cratic method. While I do not use this method per se, I do require my
students to participate; and I can do so because I know that Epstein's
explication of the basic law gives them a platform of confidence from
which to begin.
I do not mean to minimize the importance of comfort with ambi-
guity or the ability to "think like a lawyer"-far from it. As noted
above, one of my most important requirements for a torts book comes
from my desire to challenge the students intellectually. What I do
dislike, however, is this one obfuscatory method of trying to get stu-
dents to think. Epstein solves this problem nicely by setting out the
black letter law and then supplementing the black letter law with the
intellectually challenging notion of why and how it developed and
what cogent theory underlies torts, if any. This approach is challeng-
ing without being frustrating. It challenges the student to think crea-
tively and make links that are not obvious at first glance. This has the
added advantage of giving the students a tool to expand their under-
standing of torts beyond what they have learned in class. So instead of
struggling just to identify the elements of a tort, the students can think
about how and why strict liability arose from negligence, knowing that
their knowledge of black letter law rests securely in their memory,
there to serve them at a moment's notice. After all, our legal employ-
ers are not paying newly minted law students to tell them the elements
of a battery but to understand what nuances in a case might shade the"unlawfulness" of a touch. If we are going to teach our students to"think like lawyers," we might as well do so in a useful way.
Epstein's overarching questions regarding the relationship and
development of tort law, I believe, do this better than most. For in-
stance, in many torts texts, economic theory is in vogue as a way of
explaining much of torts law, from the test for reasonableness in negli-
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gence to the determination of who would be the lowest cost risk
avoider. Though economic theory does provide something of an over-
arching theory of torts, I do not think that a torts class should rely on
this economic theory exclusively. It does provide some template for
understanding some kinds of tort law, but it suffers from a lack of
generality beyond negligence and risks becoming too dislodged from
the reality of life and the law to be very inspiring or convincing to stu-
dents. Mercifully, given Epstein's reputation," he goes beyond this
single theory. What Epstein does present are the factors, economic
and otherwise, that show how one kind of tort is related to another;
how strict liability gave way to negligence; how certain factors were
explicitly identified as being important to determining liability; and
how these affect our cases today and the future of torts.
Of course, one has to be aware of this aspect of the book and
work with it. The first time I used the Epstein book I was puzzled
about the long section dealing with the historic emergence of negli-
gence from strict liability. 21 It was not that there existed some part of
the book dealing with this evolution-that was to be expected. What
was puzzling was its length and complexity. I wondered why so many
cases were needed and why so much time was devoted to this section,
given the limited amount of time we all face in attempting to teach
first year courses. However, as I taught from this section for the first
time, its importance became clearer. I may have been familiar with
the relationships between the various parts of tort law, but the stu-
dents were not. To allow them to really learn from this section re-
quired them to make these links themselves, and they did so. Since I
have understood this part of the book to be a way to engage the stu-
dents in larger ways of thinking, this learning has been enhanced.
For instance, one of the things one notices about intentional torts
and the earliest forms of strict liability is that there was an understand-
ing that people had some sort of culpability for their actions. Not that
those who committed such torts were at fault as we understand that
term, but in the simpler times of old, they could have some under-
standing of fault and precautions.22 Negligence sought to provide a bit
of fairness to the defendant, recognizing that there were some times
20. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The Dunbar Lecture: Life Boats, Desert Islands, and the Pov-
erty of Modern Jurisprudence, 68 MISS. L.J. 861 (1999) (remarks of Michael Hoffheimer).
"[T]here is no scholar in America who is... more controversial... than Professor Epstein." Id.
at 862. See also George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1464
(1992) (book review).
21. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 85-201.
22. See The Thorns Case, Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, fol. 7, Mich., pl. 18 (1466), reprinted in EPSTEIN,
supra note 2, at 86.
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when there were no obvious precautions and that, with greater interac-
tion in our society, sometimes the plaintiffs had to care for them-
selves.23 When they absorb this lesson, the students can then better
understand the situations in which strict liability may still exist. In
cases such as products liability and abnormally dangerous activities,
the students notice again that the defendants do seem to be in control
of their actions and precautions and that they are not so "innocent"
when harm is caused to a plaintiff.24
Thus, by using the Epstein book, the students learn the basics of
torts in a way that is not frustrating, but in which they are still chal-
lenged by legal theory and pushed to think. Coupled with the interest
and entertainment that are behind the choice of cases, I find the Ep-
stein book to be very appropriate for our students. Of course, no book
will fit everyone's needs or styles of teaching. But if you can deter-
mine what it is you wish to emphasize, both substantively and doctri-
nally, you can use this information to assist in selection. If, like me,
you want your students to see torts as a whole system of legal thought
rather than a series of entertaining cases or "things gone wrong," then
the Epstein book may be for you.
23. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at Ch. 4. The assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence portions of the text usually provoke a spirited student response, perhaps from a sense of
shared life experiences with the subject matter of some of the famous cases. See, e.g., Li v. Yel-
low Cab Co. of California, 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975) (automobile accidents); Derheim v. N.
Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972) (seat belts).
24. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, Ch. 9, at 647-69.
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